In 1965 the United States enacted a national health insurance programme for persons of sixty-five years and over called Medicare. In 1972, Congress extended eligibility for Medicare to individuals of any age with proven disabilities and (after a dramatic public demonstration of kidney dialysis) to those with end-stage renal disease. This only-in-America complex of beneficiaries represented continuing political efforts to sustain the viability of private health insurance for the healthiest, least costly sectors of the population; that is, those able to work and their children.

Medicare was also designed to support privately owned and operated health services, by reimbursing the costs of services given in voluntary or for-profit hospitals and by private practitioners. The structure of the programme followed the structure of private health insurance benefits in the 1960s: divided into separate programmes for hospital and medical benefits, and with major gaps and exclusions that have haunted the programme to the present. Medicare was built on social security principles of universal benefits as a right, without a means test, for eligible beneficiaries. The hospital part of the programme was designed to be financially self-sufficient, funded by designated payroll taxes on the working population. Beneficiaries have to contribute a standard monthly fee, supplemented by general tax revenues, for other parts of the programme. Services are also subject to specified contributions at time of use, in the form of deductibles and co-insurance. Medicare is geared toward acute services. At the time of writing it still excludes out-of-hospital prescription drugs (currently a hot political issue), dental care, most long-term care, and related medical and social services. The programme is, in short, a complicated patchwork. Highly popular but increasingly expensive, transferring money from workers to the elderly, providing the same benefits to rich and poor, Medicare has become a polarized political battlefield.

The political scientist Jonathan Oberlander traces the political history of the programme from its implementation in 1966 to 1994, the year when President Clinton\'s efforts to reform the entire health care system crashed and, significantly, an ideologically market-oriented, anti-governmental Republican party was elected, gaining control of Congress in 1995. The book includes an initial chapter on Medicare\'s roots as background; three chapters on the politics of benefits, financing and regulation, respectively; a chapter relating these politics to social science theories; and a concluding chapter bringing the story up to 2002. Oberlander presents the factious Congressional debates that led to Medicare\'s complicated structure in the 1960s. Nevertheless, in the next thirty years Medicare support was, he argues, solidly bipartisan, governed by the politics of consensus and with "no debate over ideology or programmatic first principles" (p. 5). The one attempt at major reform, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, extended benefits (including prescription drug coverage but not long-term care) but was repealed after strident opposition from the elderly because of its financial provisions.

There were, of course, internal changes in Medicare, nicely shown in this book. Concern about rising costs of health care marked the programme. Medicare has been subject to increasing programme regulation: through peer review, prospective payment via diagnosis-related groups, and physician fee schedules; and attempts have been made to encourage managed competition through persuading beneficiaries to join privately-run managed care insurance networks (not, as yet, very successfully). However, not until the late 1990s did fundamental ideas come seriously into question, with a shift in view from Medicare as single-payer insurance to Medicare as vehicle for health care competition.

Historians will find this book useful in illuminating a neglected period in Medicare\'s history; in supplementing more general histories of health care financing in the United States; and in terms of theory. A major conclusion is that the familiar political stereotype that the role of state is weak in the United States is not borne out in the Medicare experience.
